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RECESS APPOINTMENTS AND AN
INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
William Ty Mayton*
Presidents Clinton and Bush have revived a quiescent executive power, that of recess appointments to the bench. In the
last few days of his presidency Mr. Clinton made one such appointment. Following suit, Mr. Bush has now made two. All
three appointments were of presidential nominees for whom
Senate confirmation, either up or down, had been forestalled by
parliamentary moves. For both Presidents the attractive feature
of a recess appointment was that it placed their nominees on the
bench without Senate confirmation. But because of this by-pass
these appointments have been questioned, on political and constitutional grounds. This article is about the constitutional part of
the debate. The constitutional issues examined are: first, whether
present use of the recess appointments clause is so expansive as
to exceed the power in fact granted by the clause, thereby infringing the senatorial prerogative of "advice and consent," and
second, whether recess appointments to the bench infringe the
personal right, as derived from Article III of the Constitution, to
federal courts presided over by judges "free of political domination." This second issue, respecting the right to judges free of political domination, shows that recess appointments to the bench
are a special case.
Considering that these issues of power and right interact so
complexly, an overview seems useful, which view best starts by
identifying the recess appointments clause and its purpose. The
clause provides, "The President shall have Power to fill up all
vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of their next
Session. " 1 The purpose underlying this power is evident. In 1789
and for ten sessions thereafter, intersession recesses of Congress
* Simmons Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. I thank Seth
Cohen, 2L Emory, for his assistance and research.
I. U.S. CON ST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
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averaged seven months in length.2 During these several months
important public offices might go vacant. In anticipation of these
inopportune vacancies, the framers modified the standard of
Senate confirmation to allow for temporary presidential appointments to fill them as needed. Today, however, recesses of
the Senate are not seven months but four to five weeks. In this
short time, a new session is just around the corner and in any
event modern communications and transportation allow for special sessions of the Senate wherein crucial offices might be filled.
Therefore, the urgency toward which the recess clause was directed is not today a factor. This is especially so respecting the
bench, where other judges-by inter- and intracircuit transferscan cover a vacated post.
In any event, the clause today often serves a purpose quite
different from that of ensuring that the public service does not
suffer due to a vacancy in office left unfilled while the Senate is
dispersed and unavailable during its recess. Presently the clause
is used to create a place-holder in office who may thereby gain a
prescriptive advantage respecting that office. This possibility was
in fact noticed early on, by Senator John Quincy Adams, Jr., as
he wrote his father of a certain tactical advantage open to the
President. "Provisional appointments," he wrote, might be made
during a recess of the Senate, so that "when the Senate meet, the
candidates proposed to their consideration are already in possession of the office to which they are to be appointed. "3 In this
sense, Mr. Clinton may have made a politically astute move (as
the New York Times put it) 4 in his recess appointment of Judge
Gregory. By it he put in place, ahead of the incoming Bush administration, his own candidate. Somewhat similarly, the appointments by President Bush, of Judges Pickering and Pryor,
may defuse the filibusters that keep these appointments from being voted on. These are the political possibilities of the clause.
Safe to say, though, recess appointments for these reasons are
not what the clause is about.
The second part of this overview is about whether the present use of the recess appointments clause exceeds the terms of
the clause. These terms are that the President may fill vacancies
that "happen during the Recess of the Senate." Vacancies that
2. U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1993-94 Official Directory,103d Cong. 580 (1993).
3. JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 265 (1968).
4. "White House officials and other democrats said they thought Mr. Clinton's
action was particularly astute because it could put the Republicans on the defensive .... "
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,2000, at www.nyt.com/12/2000-28/politics.
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happen not during but before a recess- when the Senate is in
session and available for confirmation- do not generally create
the same urgency as vacancies that "happen during the recess of
the Senate." However, recess appointments as they are made today-as in the case of Clinton and Bush's appointments to the
bench-are usually for vacancies that did not happen while the
Senate was in recess. Rather, the vacancy happens at some other
time and then, usually after the Senate fails to fill the post by not
acting on the President's nominee, the President places a nominee on the bench without that appointment and by a recess appointment. The scope of power issue raised by this practice is, of
course, that the President has exceeded the power in fact provided by the text of the clause. However, in United States v. Allocco, which case is (improperly) viewed as the single, controlling authority here, the Ninth Circuit found that the plain terms
of the clause had been modified by a certain "gloss of history."5
While Allocco is itself weak on this point, the possibility remains
that the terms of Article II have been levered out of their plain
meaning by a concession on the part of Congress, a 1940
amendment to the Tenure of Office Act. But along with noting
this possibility of concession, it is also correct to note that such
claims of concession are disfavored. As explained by the Supreme Court, the appointment provisions of Article II "preserves ... the Constitution's structural integrity by preventing
the diffusion of the appointment power":
Neither Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive
this structural protection. . . . The structural interests
protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of
any one branch of Government but of the entire Republic.6
This overview's third part is about rights derived from Article III of the Constitution. In this respect, assume that the President does indeed have the power to make a recess appointment,
but consider the possibility of a check to that power by an assertion of right. There are two such rights. One is what case law
speaks of as a public right, which is our collective interest in "the
role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional
5. United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir., 1962), discussed in text at infra
notes 114-119.
6. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991). In Freytag, the claim was
that the courts should "defer to the Executive Branch's decision that there has been no
legislative encroachment on Presidential prerogatives under the Appointments Clause."
!d. at 878. The Court rejected that claim for the reasons stated above.
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scheme of tripartite government. "7 The "role" thus protected is
the better capacity of a politically independent court to sustain
the checks and balances feature of "tripartite government." I do
not wish to understate this "public right" nor imply that it is not
relevant to the case of recess appointments to the bench. After
all, in reference to the structural guarantee this right embodies,
the Supreme Court, in Nguyen v. United States, 8 recently vacated
a federal court of appeals decision because the panel that rendered it included a judge who did not have the lifetime tenure
that Article III requires. Nonetheless, Article III includes a different sort of right that is more pressing. This right is the "personal right" to "have claims decided before judges who are free
from potential domination by other branches of government. "9
This right is in play in each and every case heard by a recess appointee, and is always highly visible, always so rightly owed, and
always so clearly breached.
When a recess appointee hears a case, whether he or she
gains a permanent appointment to the bench is yet to be determined; whether the appointee gains tenure is contingent upon
renomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate.
The recess appointee, then, is not freed from political pressure
and therefore acts in the face of the personal right- as can be
claimed by any party whose claim the appointee hears-to be
heard by a politically independent judge. The startling prospect
of an assertion of this right is that whether reached singly by a
district court judge or jointly by an appellate panel, each and
every judgment that includes a recess appointee stands to be
overturned.
In recess appointments, the right to a judge freed of political
domination first came before the courts in Ex Parte Ward. 10 In
this 1899 decision the right was asserted but the Supreme Court
would not hear it owing to now defunct jurisdictional grounds.
Eighty-five years later in 1984, the right was heard and decided
by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Woodley. 11 In defendant's
7. Commodity Future Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986). The
courts also refer to this feature of the political autonomy required of judges by Article III
as the "structural principle." /d. at 850.
8. 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003).
9. Schor, 478 U.S. at, 848; Northern Pipeline Const. Co, v. Marathon Pipe Line,
458 u.s. 50,58 (1982).
10. 173 u.s. 452 (1899).
11. United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd en bane,
751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). United States v. Allocco,
305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir., 1962), is often referred to in relation to the right to a judge free of
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appeal from her conviction in a criminal case, the court on its
own motion overturned the judgment against her because it had
been rendered by a recess appointee, holding that because "[h)e
lacks the essential attributes of an Article III judge, a recess appointee to the federal bench cannot exercise the judicial power
of the United States." 12 However, on rehearing en bane, the circuit in a split decision reversed this initial decision and reinstated
the defendant's conviction.
In a notable dissent to the en bane opinion, Judge Norris
would have resolved the conflict between the recess appointments clause and Article III according to the canon that "[constitutional) principles" must be considered as "of equal dignity, and
... must [not) be so enforced as to nullify or substantially impair
another." 13 Judge Norris explained that no significant impairment of the recess appointment is caused by excluding judges
from its scope. Among other things, inter- and intracircuit transfers of judges, as provided by Title 28, alleviate immediate and
acute problems caused by a vacancy on the bench. 14 In contrast,
the independence of the judiciary is substantially impaired
whenever a judge's work is subject to political review. A recess
appointee's work is subject to such review and no human being
can be oblivious of that. In these comparative terms, resolution
of the conflict between the recess appointments clause and Article III was clear and certain: the Article III standard of a politically independent judiciary clearly prevailed. 15
However, a majority of the Ninth Circuit judges chose a
method different than the "resolution according to purposes"
method used by dissent and this different method produced a
different result. The majority instead looked to history, according to Justice Frankfurter's dictum that "a systematic, unbroken,
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who
have also sworn to uphold the Constitution ... may be treated as
a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President." 16 Doing so,
political domination. This case, though, was instead largely concerned with the scope of
the President's power, with whether the vacancy filled by a recess appointment must
have been created "during the recess" in which the appointment was made.
12. 726 F.2d at 1339.
13. Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340, 353 (1908). As expressed by Judge Norris,
"the resolution of conflict between two provisions of the Constitution requires an evaluation and balancing of underlying values." 751 F.2d at 1022.
14. 751 F.2d at 1024.
15. See id. at 1022-24.
16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter,
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the majority found that a long history of recess appointments to
the bench had established a practice of recess appointees hearing
cases, which practice amounted to the requisite gloss of history.
However, the history, historiography really, used by those judges
was off target, both in content and in technique. I say this knowing that in 1795 George Washington made a recess appointment,
of John Rutledge, to the Supreme Court and that about 160
years later President Eisenhower placed three Justices- Earl
Warren, William Brennan, and Potter Stewart-on the Court by
that same route.
The problem with the history used in the Woodley case is
that actually it was not focused on the issue in the case. This issue was not the mere fact of recess appointment but the fact the
appointee had gone ahead and heard cases prior to Senate confirmation and while he was yet in that political limbo. At first
glance, this distinction between the fact of appointment and the
appointee in fact hearing cases may seem odd but, then, consider
this: Of the twelve recess-appointments to the Court prior to the
Eisenhower appointees, only two had heard cases prior to their
confirmation. Justice Rutledge did so and then Justice Benjamin
Curtis in 1851, for a total of four cases between them. Following
Curtis and for the next one hundred years, no recess appointee
heard cases prior to his Senate confirmation.
For instance, John Harlan received a recess appointment to
the Supreme Court on March 29, 1877. The Senate confirmed
that appointment on November 29 of that year. Thereafter, he
took the oath of office on December 10. The U.S. Reports for
that year contain a "Memorandum" setting forth this information and additionally stating that Mr. Harlan "took no part in the
decision of the cases reported in this volume preceding United
States v. Fox." 17 That case was both argued and decided after
Justice Harlan was confirmed by the Senate and then sworn in.
In at least the century preceding the Eisenhower appointments
to the Supreme Court, the practice, then, was that Supreme
Court appointees did not hear cases prior to confirmation and
the fact that they did not was in succeeding years noted in the
Senate, there described as a "fine practice" and the better part of
judicial ethics. 18
J ., concurring).

17. Preface to 97 U.S. REP. (1877). Some sources list Oct. 15, 1877 as the date of
Harlan's recess appointment. The October date, though, is when President Hayes nominated him for a permanent seat on the Court.
18. 81 CONG. REC. 7993 (1937). See also infra notes 71-72.
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The unsettling part about the Eisenhower appointees, then,
was that they decided cases before they, the appointees, were
sheltered by the political independence that confirmation provides. For this reason notable scholars such as Henry Hart and
Paul Freund objected to those appointments. 19 In the wake of
these objections the Senate held hearings, the result of which
was a resolution saying that the President ought not to make recess appointments to the bench. 20 As shown by this sampling of
history, the historiography deployed in Woodley, because of its
lack of focus, is not as neat as it might seem.
All things considered, the variance between the recess appointments clause and Article III seems best ironed either by
reconciling underlying purposes, as done by the dissent in United
States v. Woodley or better yet, as I shall explain, by a text-based
and rights-oriented solution to the problem. In any event, history
should not here be the guide. But if history is taken as the guide,
the question may remain a close one. It may be close not because of appointments to the Supreme Court, here there is too
little history and too much opposition in the history there is.
Rather, the question may be close because of a history of which
little if anything has been known or reported, this history being
that of recess appointments not to the Supreme Court but to the
lower courts. This history is reported below. And as it must
given the current reliance on history in these matters, much of
this article is, regrettably, about identifying and untangling the
history used to support recess appointments to the bench.
I. THE PURPOSES OF THE RECESS
APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE AND THE TERMS,
RIGHTS, AND PURPOSES OF ARTICLE III

On September 7, 1787, the constitutional convention in
Philadelphia was about a week shy of completing its work. That
Friday, a tired group of delegates finally settled a longstanding
question about selecting high federal officers. The decision was
that the appointment of these officers would be shared by the
President and the Senate. Governeur Morris explained, "as the
President was to nominate, there would be responsibility, and as
19. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL RECORD at 1 (Oct. 8, 1953) (comments of Professors
Henry Hart, Paul Freund, Benjamin Kaplan, Ernest Brown, and Arthur Sutherland). See
text at n.73, infra.
20. S. Res. 334, 106 CONG. REC. 18145. The floor debate is at 106 CONG. REC.
18130 ff. See also Report, Recess Appointments of Federal Judges, House Committee of
the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).

522

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 20:515

the Senate was to concur, there would be security.'m Accordingly, Article II, section 2 of the Constitution provides that the
President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other
Officers of the United States."
As soon as the "appointments clause" was agreed to, Richard Dobbs Spaight of North Carolina moved that "the President
shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during
the recess of the Senate by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the end of the next Session of the Senate. "22 Such debate as there may have been is not recorded. The motion,
though, was immediately approved. Accordingly, in Article II
the appointments clause and its condition of Senate advice and
consent are followed by the proviso (set in the precise terms of
Spaight's motion) that "The President shall have Power to fill up
all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the end of their next
Session."
In public debate on the Constitution, comment on the recess
appointments clause is slight to nonexistent. In Federalist No. 67,
however, Alexander Hamilton provided a cogent description of
the clause and its purposes, as follows:
The ordinary power of appointments is confided to the President and Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised
during the session of the Senate; but as it would have improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the
appointment of officers, and as vacancies might happen during their recess, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill up without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently
intended to authorize the President, singly, to make temporary appointments "during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next
session. " 23

21. The Supreme Court has explained the "security" thus provided: "The President's power to select principal officers of the United States was not left unguarded,
however, as Article II further requires the 'Advice and Consent of the Senate.' This
serves both to curb Executive abuses of the appointment power ... and 'to promote a
judicious choice of [persons] for filling the offices of the union."' Edmond v. United
States, 520 U.S. 651,659-60 (1997).
22. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1798, at
539 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 67, at 377-78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999) (emphasis in original).
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Originally, recesses between sessions were in fact long: The first
ten recesses averaged seven months in length. In those several
months there might be a vacancy in office that if left unfilled
would impair the public service. Given the poor communication
and transportation by horseback along bad roads, reconvening
the Senate was out of the question. Quite sensibly, the President
always on the job would if needed fill the vacated office by a
temporary appointment.
A matter of greater moment at the constitutional convention was that of establishing the "judicial power of the United
States." The Declaration of Independence had charged that the
English King "made judges dependent on his will alone for the
tenure of their office."24 The autonomy promised in that declaration is kept by Article III as it provides judges with lifetime tenure and pay protection. In Federalist No. 78, Hamilton explained
that owing to its "natural feebleness" the judiciary "is in continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed or influenced by its
coordinate branches." Against this threat "nothing," Hamilton
said, "can contribute so much to [the !udiciary's] firmness and
independency as permanency in office." 5
A little less well known, perhaps, is this additional part of
Federalist No. 78, wherein Hamilton explained that a faithful attendance to individual rights "can certainly not be expected from
judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission." In
this respect, he further noted, "Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or
other, be fatal to their necessary independence." 26 Be that as it
may, Hamilton in his significant account of the recess appointments clause, explained that "as vacancies might happen during
[the Senate's] recess, which it might be necessary for the public
service to fill up without delay, the [appointment clause] is evidently intended to authorize the President ... to make temporary appointments." 27 The question raised by these accounts, of
course is: How are the "temporary appointments" of the recess
appointments to be squared with "temporary commissions"
inimical to Article III?

24. Declaration of Independence, '113 (1776).
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 434 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
26. Id. at 439 (emphasis added).
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999) (emphasis added).
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Not readily. Respecting recess appointments, Article II, section 2 clause 3 flatly states that "The President shall have the
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess
of the Senate" and does so without allowance for judges. As
flatly, Article III states that judges "shall hold their offices during good Behavior" and does so without allowance for recess
appointees. For any number of people, including the judges in
United States v. Woodley, these terms established an impasse
that cannot be broken by textual analyses. 28 However, textual
impasse, as I shall discuss, is not necessarily the case. For the
moment, though, let us assume that such impasse is the case. But
with impasse thus the case, it does not follow that the conflict between the recess appointments clause and Article III evades
resolution.
A. RESOLUTION IN TERMS OF PURPOSES

In the rare circumstance where constitutional provisions are
hopelessly at odds, the interpretational process does not stop; it
cannot stop when resolution of a case requires resolution of the
conflict. As interpretation thus proceeds, it may usefully do so
according to the canon that "[constitutional] principles" must be
considered as "of equal dignity, and ... must [not] be so enforced as to nullify or substantially impair another." 29 Brought to
bear on recess appointments to the bench, analysis under this
canon shows that the independence of the judiciary can be protected without much (if at all) impairing presidential power under the recess appointments clause. In 1787, when Senate recesses were expected to be long and in fact were, there might be
a vacated post that if left unfilled would be detrimental to the
public service. Today, intersession recesses average not seven
months but four weeks or so. In these few weeks there is no seat
that if left unfilled for a few weeks would do much damage to
the public service, and this is particularly so as regards the
bench. Article III judges can be transferred from one court to
the other to cover vacancies as they might occur. For these and
other reasons, an able constitutional lawyer, Senator Sam Ervin
(in debate on the Senate's 1960 resolution against recess appointments to the bench) explained, "there is, really, no crying

28. As explained in Woodley, "while Article III speaks specifically about the tenure
of federal judges, Article II is equally specific in addressing the manner of their appointment. There is therefore no reason to favor one Article over the other." 751 F.2d at 1010.
29. Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340,353 (1908).
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need for the President to make a recess appointment or for having the recess appointee take office." 30
No purpose of the recess appointment clause is served by an
appointment to the bench. However, each and every case decided by the recess appointee does considerable damage to the
Article III right to be heard by a judge free of political domination.
B. TEXTUAL RESOLUTION- IN TERMS OF
RIGHTS-OF THE CONFLICT

Such conflict as exists between Article III and the recess
appointments can be resolved, as above, by comparing the purposes of the two provisions. It does not follow, though, that this
is the optimal means of resolution. Despite misgivings as in the
Woodley case, textual resolution of the conflict is possible, which
resolution is consistent with case law already in place and is illuminating and serving respecting the values underlying Article
III and the public policies underlying the recess appointments
clause.
What is this textual solution? To be sure, if here one looks
for an explicit solution, a piece of text by which the one constitutional provision allows for the other, resolution cannot be had.
But then, resolution by reference to explicit textual aids is not to
be expected, not under ordinary methods of constitutional interpretation. As said by John Marshall, a Constitution cannot "partake of the prolixity of a legal code." 31 Accordingly, Justice
Scalia has explained that at points of intersection and conflict
"the Appointments Clause does not (in the style of the Uniform
Commercial Code) contain an explicit cross-reference to Article
III." 32 Per Scalia's point, the absence of such aids does not mean
that a dissonance between Article III and the President's appointment powers cannot be worked out. Rather, it simply
bumps the interpretational work to a more conceptuallevel. 33 At
30. 106 CONG. REC. 18142-43. Sen. Ervin's remarks here are worth reading. He
showed, by examining the district courts, the courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court,
that for none of them is any purpose of the recess appointments clause served by recess
appointments to the bench. As regards transfers of judges to cover vacated posts, the dissenting judges in the Woodley case made the same point as Ervin, saying "interdistrict or
intercircuit assignments provide an expedient and effective way of dealing with a shortterm problem." 751 F.2d at 1024.
31. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819).
32. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868,901 (1991).
33. For Scalia in the Freytag case, the higher generality was structural. It was to
"examine the Appointments Clause of the Constitution in light of the 'cognate provi-
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this level a difference in quality of between the requirements of
Article III and the provision of the recess appointments clause is
evident. The clause provides for a discretionary power: The
President may or may not cover a vacancy by means of recess
appointment. In comparison, the judicial autonomy provided by
Article III is stated as a mandate: The terms are that "Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices
during good behavior." In constitutional design, hard and fast
language of this sort operates as a check on discretionary power.
For instance, the First Amendment states, "Congress shall
make no laws ... abridging the freedom of speech." In operation, this provision checks the various (discretionary) powers
granted Congress by Article I. However, this restraint thus imposed is not absolute. Instead, the right to free speech is protected by putting Congress to a high burden of justification for a
curtailment of the right. 34 As congressional power is thus adjusted to the "shall not" of the First Amendment, so should
presidential power under the recess appointments clause be adjusted to the "shall hold their offices during good Behavior"
terms of Article III. The first step in this adjustment has been
accomplished; the courts have, out of Article Ill, established the
right to a judge free of political domination. In turn, this right
should-as do First Amendment rights-check recess appointments to the bench, by requiring that for these and only these
appointments the President meet a certain burden of justification.
This burden can be calculated according to the parsimony
usually referred to as Occam's razor. Presently, the burden need
be no more than to insist that a recess appointment to the bench
be compelled by the urgency on which the recess appointments
clause is in fact based. This urgency, of course, is the harm to the
public service caused by leaving unfilled a vacancy created during a recess of the Senate, which urgency and which burden does
no more than to confine presidential power to the terms and
purposes of the recess appointments clause. What would be
eliminated from the power, and removed only for appointments
to the bench, is the various accretions to it that have built up
over time, accretions such as appointments outside the plain

sions' of which it is a central feature: Article I, Article II, and Article Ill." /d.
34. For example, in the context of electoral activities, the burden is that of an "exacting
scrutiny" under which a restriction is permissible only if "it is narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest." Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,347 (1995).
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terms of the clause and for no reason other than to establish a
placeholder's claim to the office.
C. THE CASE LAW THAT ESTABLISHES THE RIGHT

Reconciliation of the terms of Article III with those of the
recess appointments clause is sustained by what I have to this
point more or less asserted as an Article III right to a judge freed
of political domination. Now it is appropriate to establish the
bona fides of this right. An original expression of it is that of
Federalist No. 78, as follows: "That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution and of individuals,
which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice,
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices
by a temporary commission." 35 The same point-now in opposition to a recess appointment to the bench-came to be made in
the Senate: "Since the provision for lifetime tenure for Federal
judges is clearly for the benefit of litigants rather than for the
benefit of the judges themselves, this provision must be regarded
as one of the constitutional guarantees of civil rights, and this
right of a trial before a lifetime judge or judges is as much a right
of every litigant as his right of trial by jury in criminal cases." 36
Of course, a "right of a trial before a lifetime judge" is most
authoritatively established by the courts. In Glidden v. Zdanok/ 7
judges from the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals had been assigned to the circuit courts of appeals. Litigants then claimed that the participation of these
judges in their cases denied them "the protection of judges with
tenure and compensation guaranteed by Article Ill. "38 The Supreme Court denied this contention inasmuch as "the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are courts
created under Article III" and judges from these courts "are and

35. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter cd.,
1999).
36. Nomination of Potter Stewart, Sen. Jud. Comm., Ex. Report No. 2, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 2, 7 (Apr. 29, 1959). By reference to the work of John Marshall, the modem
Supreme Court has made much the same point. "A judge's decision may affect an individual's 'property, his reputation, his life, his all.' In the 'exercise of these duties,' the
judge must 'observe the utmost fairness.' The judge must be 'perfectly and completely
independent, with nothing to influence or contro(l] him but God and his conscience."'
United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 569 (2001), quoting Proceedings and Debates of
the Virginia State Convention, of 1829-1830,616, 619 (1830).
37. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
38. !d. at 533.
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have been protected in tenure and compensation. "39 While the
Court thus found that the right had not been violated, the existence of the right, to be heard by judges "protected in tenure and
compensation" is implicit in the ~inion. In Northern Pipeline
Canst. Co, v. Marathon Pipe Line, the right implicit in Glidden
won out, causing the Court to overturn the Bankruptcy Act of
1978.
Northern Pipe Line had sued Marathon in federal bankruptcy court for damages for breach of contract. Under the 1978
Act, bankruptcy judges did not have life-tenure; rather, they
were appointed for fourteen-year terms. This being the case,
Marathon moved to dismiss the suit against it, on the grounds
that the 1978 Act "unconstitutionally conferred Art. III judicial
power upon judges who lacked life tenure and protection against
salary diminution." 41 In reviewing this motion, the Supreme
Court started with this premise: '"A Judiciary free from control
by the Executive and Legislature is essential if there is a right to
have claims decided by judges who are free from potential
domination by other branches of government.'" 42 Because bankruptcy judges did not have the requisite tenure and pay protections, the Court then held that Congress had unconstitutionally
placed "judicial Power" in these judges and in doing so had denied that right. Which holding of course forces this question: If a
bankruptcy judge with a fourteen-year appointment and holding
only some of the judicial power cannot exercise that power, how
can a recess appointee with a one-year term be invested with all
of the judicial power?
Following the Northern Pipeline case, the Court in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor43 examined whether and why
Congress might assign some part of the judicial power to administrative agencies. In this effort, the Court assessed the "purposes" of
Article III and in doing so identified two. One purpose was structural, which the Court described as the "public function" of
checking the other parts of government as they might try to expand their power beyond constitutionally assigned limits. 44 The
other purpose was personal, that of a "personal guarantee of an
independent and impartial adjudication," which guarantee the
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

/d. at 532, 584.
458 u.s. 50 (1982).
/d. at 56.
/d. at 57 (quoting United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200,217-18 (1980)).
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
/d. at 847.
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Court described as the "personal right" to "have claims decided
before judges who are free from potential domination by other
branches of government." 45
Currently, the right to a judge free of political domination
gains strong support from the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in
Nguyen v. United States. 46 Defendants in a criminal case had appealed their conviction in a territorial court, the District Court of
Guam, to the Ninth Circuit. That circuit then affirmed the conviction. However, the panel that heard the appeal consisted of
two Article III judges plus a territorial judge selected from the
South Pacific region that had been the site of the trial. This judge
had been placed on the panel under 28 U.S.C. § 292(a), which
provides, "The chief judge of a circuit may designate and assign
one or more district judges within the circuit to sit upon the
court of appeals ... whenever the business of that court so requires." The territorial judge thus selected had been appointed
to the bench for a term of ten years, within which term the judge
could be removed by the President "for cause. "47 Because he
lacked lifetime tenure, the territorial judge that heard defendants' appeal was not an Article III judge, a matter defendants
raised (for the first time) in their petition for review of that decision by the Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, petitioners argued (1) their constitutional right to be heard only by Article III judges and (2)
certain statutory grounds. The Court found for the petitioners on
the statutory grounds. It held that the act, 28 U.S.C. § 292(a),
under which the territorial judge had been assigned to the Ninth
Circuit panel allowed for assignments of only Article III judges
to the circuit courts. For the Court, Justice Stephens referred to
"Congress' decision to preserve the Article III character of the
courts of appeals" and found that "Section 292(a) does not permit any assignment to the courts of appeals of a district judge
who does not enjoy the protections set forth in Article III. "48
45. !d.
46. 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003).
47. The court from which the territorial judge had been selected, the District Court
for the Northern Marianna Islands, was an Article I court, established by Congress pursuant to its authority to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." 123 S. Ct. at 2134-35.
48. !d. at 2137. The decision was 5-4. However, the dissenting justices agreed that a
non-Article III judge could not be assigned to the Article III court. They dissented because the petitioners while knowing that the Ninth Circuit panel included a non-Article
III judge had without objection briefed and argued their case before that panel. Only
after they lost did they object by means of their petition for Supreme Court review. The
dissent was therefore of the opinion that petitioners had waived their right to complain of
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Accordingly, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit proceeding because it included the non-Article III judge. Having thus disposed
of the case on statutory grounds, the Court as a matter of course
did not address the petitioner's constitutional arguments. 49 But
considering that the statutory decision was underwritten by the
"strong policy" (derived from Article III) of reserving federal
courts for Article III judges, the decision considerably supports
the constitutional ri~ht (derived from Article III) to a politically
independent judge. 5
D. APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO RECESS
APPOINTMENTS: THE EX PARTE WARD
AND WOODLEY CASES

A recess appointee gains a temporary appointment, good
only until the end of the next Senate session. Whether the appointee gains a permanent commission depends (1) on whether
in that next session the President nominates the appointee for a
permanent commission and (2) on whether the Senate then confirms that nomination. In these circumstances, the appointee remains subject to political pressures.51 These pressures might not
at all influence a judge's handling of a trial. Or consciously or
the composition of the panel. /d. at 2139.
49. The Court stated, "Petitioners contend that the participation of an Article IV
judge on the panel violated structural constitutional guarantees embodied in Article III
and in the Appointments Clause, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. We find it unnecessary to discuss the constitutional questions because the statutory violation is clear."
2135 at n.9. Nguyen thus seems an application of the canon that " 'where an otherwise
acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress."' Solid Waste Agency v. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531
u.s. 159,173 (2001).
50. Moreover, this policy, as Nguyen showed, is exceptionally strong. The Court
found that the violation of it was not subject to waiver, as by the petitioner's failure
timely to object to the non-Article III judge. Nor could the violation be excused by an
assertion of no prejudicial error. The count of no prejudicial error was that the threejudge panel that upheld the petitioners' conviction had done so unanimously. Therefore,
the decision was supported by two Article III judges who provided the majority upon
which the decision could be upheld. But as against allowing a judge without the tenure
provided by Article III to sit on a court constituted under this Article, the government's
argument of prejudicial error was to be of no avail. 123 S. Ct. at 2138.
51. As found by the original panel in Woodley, "a judge will scarcely be oblivious to
the effect his decision may have on the vote of these officials." 726 F.2d. at 1330. That the
on-the-bench performance of a recess appointee will indeed be reviewe<l by the Senate is
indicated by the confirmation debate on Judge Gregory, where it was noted that "His
performance on the bench since his [recess] appointment has been uniformly praised."
147 CONG. REC. S7988 (July 20, 2001). Also, it was noted, by Sen. Warner of Virginia,
"Many, if not all, Senators are concerned about judicial activism. The judicial's special
role is to interpret the law, not make law. Judge Gregory assured me he will follow this
traditional role." !d. at S7990.
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unconsciously, the judge might be influenced: She might act in a
politically correct way or, instead, she might, by bracing herself
against the pressure, overreact in the opposite direction.52
Whether these pressures in fact influence a decision in these
ways is usually neither provable nor disprovable, which is a reason that Article III precludes this influence be it real or potential. Accordingly, as expressed by the Court the right to a judge
free of political domination specifically precludes the "potential"
of such domination. The right is to "have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches
of government. "53
That a recess appointee is subject to the "potential domination" of the President and Senate is, then, a self-evident statement of fact. This fact was first asserted in 1899 in Ex Parte
Ward. 54 Here, the defendant in a criminal case used the writ of
habeas corpus to ask that his conviction be overturned because
the judge who convicted him had not been "authorized to exercise any portion of the judicial power." 55 Before the Supreme
Court, his argument was that "the president could not during the
recess of the Senate and without its concurrence, by his commission invest an appointee with any portion of the judicial power
of the U.S. Government as defined in Article III of the Constitution, because that article requires that judges of the U.S. courts
shall hold their office during good behavior. "56
That argument was well stated. Nonetheless, the Court declined to hear it on the grounds, good at the time, that the power
of a "de facto" judge could not be challenged. "De facto" meant
that the court (as opposed to the judge) otherwise had jurisdiction and this jurisdiction was sufficient to validate a decision.
Today, though, at least for claims that judges do not have proper
Article III credentials, the Supreme Court has done away with

52. In the 1960 debate on recess appointments to the bench, Senator Hart noted: A
litigant may "for the rest of his life wonder" whether an appointee had succumbed to
pressure from the Senate or the President or had instead "rear[ed] back and ben[t] the
other way in order to prove that he was not subservient to such pressure." 106 CONG.
REC. 18134 (1960). For an account, of the possibilities and subtleties of this influence see
Judge Norris's dissenting opinion in the Woodley case. 751 F.2d at 1022-23.
53. E.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986)
(emphasis added); see also Glidden Co. v. Zdanock, 370 U.S. 530, 533 (1963) ("Article
III, sec.l, however, is explicit and gives the petitioners a basis for complaint without requiring them to point to particular instances of mistreatment in the record").
54. 173 u.s. 452 (1899).
55. !d. at 454.
56. !d. at 453-54.
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this doctrine. In Glidden v. Zdanok, 57 where litigants asserted
that an assignment of judges from the Court of Claims and the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to circuit courts of appeals denied them "the protection of judges with tenure and
compensation guaranteed by Article III," the government
claimed that this assertion of right was barred by the de facto
judge doctrine. 58 The Court rejected this claim, finding that that
while the doctrine was usefully concerned with the efficiencies
gained by protecting judgments from collateral attack, these efficiencies were not of such weight as to preclude a court from determining whether a judge not fully qualified under Article III
could decide cases. Specifically, the Court ruled that the doctrine
does not apply to "basic constitutional protections designed in
part for the benefit of litigants," which protections included the
right to a judge free of political domination. 59
Accordingly, when this was asserted in United States v.
Woodley, the "de facto judge" doctrine was no longer a bar. The
facts of Woodley were that ahead of turning over his office to
President-elect Reagan, President Carter placed Judge Walter
Heen on the bench by means of a recess appointment. Judge
Heen then presided over the trial and conviction of Janet Woodley on drug charges. In Ms. Woodley's appeal from that conviction, the Ninth Circuit on its own motion questioned whether
Ms. Woodley's conviction had been consistent with her right to
be heard by an autonomous court, because "[a] judge receiving
his commission under the recess appointments clause may be
called upon to make politically charged decisions while his
nomination awaits approval by popularly elected officials." 60 Following what it found to be controlling Supreme Court precedent
(Glidden and Marathon), the court then vacated the lower court
decision. On the government's strong urging, the Ninth Circuit
then reheard the case en bane.
En bane, the circuit split 7 to 4. The dissenting judges, as we
have said, would have decided the case by identifying and then
reconciling the purposes underlying the recess appointments
clause and Article III. This decisional process was altogether
proper and fitting. It entailed an analysis of constitutional structure so as not to warp it. Giving due consideration to the purpose of recess appointments, that of not rendering an office dys57.
58.
59.
60.

370 u.s. 530 (1962).
ld. at 533.
/d. at 535-36; see also Nguyen v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2130,2135-37 (2003).
726 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1983).
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functional for not being promptly filled, the dissenters' found
that no such dysfunction called for Judge Heen's appointment.
On the other hand, the Article III value in judges freed from political domination was substantially breached as Judge Heen undertook to hear cases prior to Senate confirmation.
The majority did not dispute these conclusions by the dissent; rather, it ignored them. As charged by the dissent, the majority simply "omit[ted] the step of weighing competing values,
resulting in a truncated analysis almost entirely based on historical analysis." 61 On the basis of a surely truncated history, the majority found "an unbroken" acceptance of a practice of recess
appointments to the bench and found that this practice now controlled the constitutional scheme of things. This resort to history
seriously complicates present studies. As said by Judge Norris in
his dissent in Woodley:
Thus, could we set historical practice aside, I believe our decision today would be relatively easy .... [T]he principle that
animate the salary and tenure provisions of Article IIIjudicial independence and separation of powers-clearly outweigh the concerns of expediency and efficiency that underlie
the Recess Appointments Clause. In other words, if we were
writing on a clean slate, if we were reviewing Judge Heen's
recess commission without history to support it, I find it inconceivable that we would interpret the Constitution as the
majority does today-subordinating Article III values to the
executive's general power to make recess appointments. 62

But because the majority in the one full dress decision in this
area did find history determinative, history cannot now be ignored and to it we turn.
II. THE HISTORY RESPECTING THE RIGHT
By itself an executive practice may be nothing more than an
extended usurpation of power. 63 The checks and balances provided by the Constitution can, however, help determine whether
usurpation or legitimacy is the case. Oppositinn by Congress or
the courts helps to identify usurpation; their acquiescence helps
61. 751 F.2d 1008, 1020 (9th Cir. 1985).
62. !d. at 1024 (Norris, J., dissenting).
63. The prominent authority that a historical practice in and of itself cannot alter
the power held by a branch of government is, of course, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), where a sustained congressional practice of "legislative vetoes" did not save that
practice from being overturned by the Supreme Court.
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to mark legitimacy. 64 Accordingly, the majority in Woodley adduced history that it said showed "an unbroken acceptance of the
President's use of the recess power to appoint federal judges by
the three branches of government." 65 That his'i:ory, though, is deficient in that it did not in fact show an "acceptance" by the
other branches, not of the practice actually in question. This
practice was not recess appointments per se but whether a recess
appointee's hearing of a case prior to his confirmation violated
the litigant's right to be heard by a judge freed of political pressure. A history of recess appointments to the bench is one thing;
a history of those appointees hearing cases prior to confirmation
is something else. This point in mind, we now review the history.
A. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE

The practice of recess appointments to the bench is commonly said to have begun with that of John Rutledge in 1795.
These accounts are substantially but not perfectly correct. The
first such appointment, which incidentally involved Rutledge,
occurred four years earlier in 1791. In its first term, the Supreme
Court met for ten days and heard no cases. John Rutledge was a
member of that Court, although he was, as he said, disappointed
at not being appointed Chief Justice. After that Term Rutledge
resigned to become Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme
Court. George Washington filled his vacated seat by what was
the first recess appointment, that of Thomas Johnson in 1791.
This appointment was confirmed six weeks later, well before
Johnson heard any cases.
When John Jay resigned as Chief Justice in 1795, Rutledge
wrote President Washington to say that while it would be unbecoming for him to apply for that position he was indeed available. Washington quickly replied, telling Rutledge that the Chief
Justice seat was his. Inasmuch as the Senate was then deep in its
recess, this appointment was a recess appointment. Owing to
some combination of Rutledge's impolitic remarks and a perception of unfitness, this appointment was not well received. Just
64. Thus Frankfurter, in his classic statement of the gloss-of-history method of constitutional interpretation, referred to an "executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11
(1952) (concurring); see also United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915)
("the long, continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a
presumption that the withdrawals had been ma~e in pursuance of its consent or of a
recognized administrative power of the Executive m the management of the pubhc
lancti5). 751 F.2d at 1011 (emphasis added).
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before Rutledge took his seat on the bench, he publicly spoke
against the "Jay Treaty" with Great Britain. This treaty was dear
to the Federalist majority in the Senate and they fell on
Rutledge with some vehemence, as shown by this letter from Attorney General Bradford to Alexander Hamilton: "That crazy
speech of Mr. Rutledge, joined to certain information that he is
daily sinking into debility of mind and body, will probably prevent him receiving the appointment." It did. When the Senate
convened, it rejected his nomination. In the meantime, Rutledge,
by means of his temporary appointment, took his seat with the
Court and participated in two decisions. After the Senate refused to confirm his nomination, Rutledge resigned without finishing the term to which he had been appointed, saying he felt
unsuited to the position. 66
Fifty-six years passed, and then Benjamin Curtis was the
next recess appointee to hear cases before he was confirmed. He
was appointed by Millard Fillmore on September 22, 1851, was
sworn in October 10, and then was on the bench for twenty days
before he was confirmed. In that brief period, though, he participated in two decisions. When Curtis accepted his appointment, he wrote the President that he wished to assume his circuit
duties as soon as possible, owing to "a term on the Circuit Court
at Boston ... at which my presence is very desirable." 67 The
pressing matter at Boston seems to have been "The Fugitive
Slave Trials." A "young man of color, who was a member of the
bar" had been indicted under the Fugitive Slave Law because he
had participated in the "forcible rescue" (from the marshal's office at the federal court in Boston) of an escaped slave. Local
feeling ran high in favor of that young man. Under his temporary
appointment, Justice Curtis presided over his trial, in which he
made an unpopular ruling against "jury nullification." Defendant's counsel had asked Curtis to instruct the jury that it might
disregard the Fugitive Slave Law if it found that statute to be unconstitutional. Curtis refused to do so. The defendant, however,
was not convicted, in part because of favorable rulings by Curtis
on evidentiary matters. 68
66. His words, in his letter of resignation, were that "it takes a Constitution less
broken than mine." Louis Fisher, Recess Appointments of Judges 14, Cong. Research
Serv. Report for Cong. (2002); see 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY, 127-29, 131, 133, 137 (1922).
67. THE LIFE AND WRITING OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS 156 (1879).
68. United States v. Robert Morris, 26 F.Cas. 1323 (1851) (No. 15,815); see LIFE
AND WRITING OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, supra note 67, at 160-63; 1 WARREN,
supra note 66, at 500-03.
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Justice Curtis was known as person of considerable integrity, unlikely to be swayed by political or popular pressure,
which did not mean he was not subject to such pressure because
he was not yet confirmed. Some indication of this pressure was
given at a memorial service on Curtis's death. One of the presenters that day was Richard Dana. Apart fro:::n giving his name,
Curtis's biography does not identify Mr. Dana. However, in the
Federal Cases report of The Fugitive Slave Trials, counsel for the
defendant is listed as "R.H. Dana."69 "About twenty-two years
ago," said Dana at Justice Curtis's memorial, "the bar, the political world, the public were extremely excited by the Fugitive
Slave trials." Justice Curtis, though, "conduct[ed] the trials with
impartiality," and, indeed, with an "affirmative determination
that the trials should be done with absolute fairness." That determination was to Dana all the more remarkable because it was
exerted against a certain pressure: "And they who remember how
things stood in Washington in those days will see the force of the
suggestion that Judge Curtis had not been confirmed by the Senate, but was acting upon an executive appointment made during a
recess of the Senate. "70
A century passed in which three recess appointments were
made to the Supreme Court. None of these appointees, Justices
Davis, Harlan, and Holmes, heard cases prior to their confirmation. In time, the fact that they had not heard cases prior to their
confirmation was declared to be good practice. In 1937 and under the threat of a recess appointment to the Court by President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, a point of objection raised in the Senate
was that heretofore Justices had not "taken their seats upon the
bench until they have been confirmed by the Senate of the
United States." Were an unconfirmed judge to decide a case,
that action, it was said, "would seriously reflect upon the ethical
standard of the nominee. "71 On that occasion the following resolution was submitted to the Senate: "That it is the sense of the
Senate that an appointment to the Supreme Court should be
made only at such time as the Senate may act upon confirmation
69. 26 F.Cas. at 1323 (No. 15,815).
70. LIFE AND WRITING OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, supra note 67, at 162-63
(emphasis in original).
71. 81 CONG. REc. 8002 (1937). There were several other expressions of ethical
concerns. E.g., "I don't think any self-respecting lawyer would ... serve as a member of
the Supreme Court of the United States during the interim before being confirmed by
the Senate. /d. at 7995. The fact that Holmes had not taken his seat prior to confirmation
was seen as "a clear ethical demonstration ... there ought not to be ... any sitting Justices who have not been confirmed." /d. at 8000.
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prior the entry of the nominee upon his service." 72 No vote was
taken, though, probably because President Roosevelt drew back
from the threatened appointment.
Twenty years later President Eisenhower made his recess
appointments to the Supreme Court. Why he chose this route of
appointments is, so far as I know, unknown. But starting with
Warren, the three justices he appointed commenced to hear and
decide cases before the Senate confirmed their tenure. No one
suggested that the prospects of confirmation in any way swayed
these Justices in these cases. Be that as it may, the idea that unconfirmed judges are subject to unacceptable political pressures
came to the fore. For instance, Professor Henry Hart objected to
Earl Warren's appointment as follows:
Governor Warren cannot possible have this independence if
his every vote, indeed his every question from the bench, is
subject to the possibility of inquiry in later committee hearings and floor debates to determine his fitness to continue in
judicial office .... The point is not what Governor Warren
and his friends will think about his disinterestedness but what
defeated litigants will think .... 73

Thereafter, Senator Joseph McCarthy rudely illustrated "the
possibility of inquiry." During Justice Brennan's confirmation
hearings the Senator asked him how he felt about "rooting out
subversives." Justice Brennan replied, "Will you forgive me an
embarrassment, Senator. You will appreciate that I am a sitting
Justice of the Court. There are presently pending before the
Court some cases in which I believe will have to be decided the
question what is communism." 74
At Justice Stewart's confirmation hearing, the case that recess appointees should not hear cases prior to Senate confirmation assumed its modern form, that of a violation of a core constitutional right. The dissent to Justice Stewart's confirmation
argued as follows:
No man can be a Federal judge until he has been appointed
and commissioned to serve during good behavior. ... Since
the provision for lifetime tenure for Federal judges is clearly
for the benefit of litigants rather than for the benefit of the
72. !d. at 7963. The Senate opposition to Roosevelt's thre;,t of a recess appointment
is further discussed at supra notes 100-103.
73. 17 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL RECORD 1-3 (Oct. 8, 1953).
74. Nomination of William J. Brennan, Jr., Sen. Jud. Comm. 17 (85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1957).
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judges themselves, this provision must be regarded as one of
the constitutional guarantees of civil rights, and this right of a
trial before a lifetime judge or judges is as much a ri~ht of
every litigant as his right of trial by jury in criminal cases. 5

This objection- grounded in the "right of a trial before a
lifetime judge"- was studiously made, possibly owing to the
groundwork of a Senate Judiciary Committee study, delivered
January 19, 1959, on "Recess Appointments and Federal
Judges." 76 This lengthy report delineated the conflict between
recess appointments and judicial independence and tried to identify what the Senate might do to alleviate the conflict. And here
was the rub: Exactly what could the Senate do? Presidential
power under the recess appointments clause is exercised without
Senate participation and for this reason seems beyond constraint
by that body. (One thing Congress can do and has done, though,
is to refuse to pay an officer improperly appointed under the recess appointments clause.)77
On that occasion what the Senate did do was as follows. After the Stewart confirmation hearings, the Senate Judiciary
Committee submitted the following resolution to the Senate:
That it is the sense of the Senate that the making of recess appointments to the Supreme Court of the United States may
not be wholly consistent with the best interest of the Supreme
Court, the nominee who may be involved, the litigants before
the Court, nor indeed, the people of the United States, and
that such appointments, therefore, should not be made except
under unusual circumstances and for the purpose of preventing a demonstrable breakdown in the administration of the
Court's business. 78

While this resolution was directed to Supreme Court appointees,
the debate on it addressed federal judges in general. Various
questions were raised. One question was whether the Senate
could forthrightly determine the qualifications of a nominee already on the bench. "It would be a little difficult," it was said,
"with our attitude and our regard for the law, to have a man
75. Nomination of Potter Stewart, Sen. Jud. Comm., Ex. Report No.2, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2, 7 (Apr. 29, 1959).
76. House Judiciary Comm., Recess Appointments of Federal Judges, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959). The report was prepared by the committee staff and the American Law
Division of the Library of Congress.
77. See Tenure in Office Act, 28 U .S.C. § 5503 (2000); infra notes 98-99.
78. S. Res. 334, 106 CONG. REC. 18,145 (1960). The floor debate is at 106 CONG.
REC. 18,130.
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walk into committee who is wearing the judicial robes, after
seven or eight decisions, [and] be questioned with reference to
his competency." 79
The next question was about the constitutionality (and propriety) of a judge yet subject to the political pressure of confirmation sitting down to try cases. These ill-effects of these pressures were described as follows: A litigant "may for the rest of
his life wonder" whether his case was influenced, consciously or
unconsciously, by the temporary judge's knowledge that he must
please the President, so that he does not withdraw the judge's
nomination, and the Senate, so that it confirms him. The judge
might bend to these pressures or he might do the opposite; he
"might rear back and bend the other way in order to prove that
he was subservient to neither branch." Senator Ervin, himself a
former state supreme court justice, identified these pressures as
contrary to Article III, saying:
[T)he third article of the Constitution ... clearly contemplates
that the federal courts shall be presided over by judges who
hold office for life .. ·.· Therefore, it is somewhat inconsistent
with the spirit of the third article ... for a judge to make decisions when he does not occupv his office for life but only until
the next session of the Senate.1l0

The resolution was then adopted by the Senate.
B. LOWER COURT PRACTICE

History, unfortunately, does not always generate a sharp
resolution of a problem. In addition to the history above, of a
pronounced opposition to Supreme Court appointees hearing
cases prior to confirmation, there is also a heretofore unknown
history respecting lower court appointments. This history blurs
the sharper picture offered by appointments to the Supreme
Courts.
Nowhere, not in public debate, in Congress, in the courts, or
in scholarly commentary has this lower court practice respecting
recess appointments been previously presented, which inatten-

79. 106 CONG. REC. 18,136 (1960). The same objection had been made in the floor
debate in 1937: "The Senate is not a free agent to pass upon the credentials of the nominee if the nominee ... has clothed himself with the robes of office, has participated in
Court proceedings, deliberations and decisions ... and then comes before the Senate for
confirmation." 81 CONG. REC. 7999 (1937) (Sen. Vandenberg)
80. 106 CONG. REC. 18,143 (1960).
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tion seems to have been because of a lack of records. 81 It turns
out, though, that there is a probably adequate database. In the
Woodley cases, the Ninth Circuit ordered the Justice Department to prepare a record of recess appointments to the federal
courts, which record was then prepared and appended to the
Department's brief in the case. 8 That appendix lists recess appointments from the 1790s to Judge Heen in 1980 to the lower
courts. That appendix, though, provides no information respecting the question at hand, which is whether those judges, prior to
being confirmed by the Senate, heard and decided cases.
We can now derive the date that would enable us to answer
this question. While the Justice Department-prepared index
does not contain information itself sufficient to generate this answer, it does supply a key: The index provides the dates that
lower-court judges received their recess appointment and the
dates they were confirmed. With these judges and these dates,
common electronic databases can today be checked to see
whether these judges signed and delivered any opinions in the
period between their recess appointment and later Senate confirmation. This cross-checking shows that a significant number of
them did hear cases prior to their confirmation.
There have been 294 recess appointments to the lower
courts. Roughly thirty-one percent of them heard and decided
cases prior to their confirmation. 83 Unlike the Supreme Court,
81. For example, the Congressional Research Service has noted the lack of records:
"Before July 1965 ... recess appointments were recorded in a haphazard fashion. Although the Congressional Record is the best source ... it is neither complete nor wholly
reliable." Memorandum, Government Division, Congressional Research Service, Library
of Congress, to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs (Mar. 13,
1985), quoted in Michael A. Carrier, Note, When is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of
the Recess Appointments Clause, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204,2209 n.31 (1994).
82. Second Supplemental Brief for Appellee, United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d
1328 (9th Cir. 1983) (No. 82-1028). The Justice Department prepared list of appointees
and dates in large part from files maintained by the Deputy Attorney General. In other
parts (appointments in the 1800s) that list had to be "reconstructed" from records originally kept by the State Department.
83. These numbers should stand even if the records, as they surely are, are only
roughly accurate. No complete central record of such appointments was kept and the
Justice Department had to reconstruct some parts of its index from State Department
files. Given its position in the Woodley case, the Justice Department would not likely
under-report the number of recess appointments. Nor would electronic databases overreport the number of opinions signed by these appointees prior to their confirmation.
Therefore, combining the list of appointees with electronic convincingly shows that recess appointees to the lower federal courts did hear a significant number of cases prior to
the Senate confirmation of these judges. It is unlikely that unreported opinions would
change this conclusion. An appendix, identifying the lower court judges and whether or
not the judges so appointed heard cases prior to confirmation, can be obtained from the
author at lawwtm@emory.edu.

2003-04]

RECESS APPOINTMENTS

541

there are not the same long gaps- the century between Curtis
and the Eisenhower appointees- between recess appointees
who heard cases prior to their confirmation. In the lower courts,
the gaps of any significance are an initial thirty-four years (from
1796 until 1828) when no recess appointees heard cases prior to
their confirmation. From 1828 until 1891 there is a spattering
(six) of recess appointees who heard cases before they were confirmed. From 1891 until 1980, there is, though, a steady drumbeat of recess appointees hearing cases prior to confirmation, up
until the contested fact of Judge Heen hearing a case in 1980.
From Judge Heen's appointment until that of Judge Gregory in
2000, there is a twenty-year gap.
What are we to make of this record respecting lower court
appointments? In trying to answer this question, we should keep
in mind that the lower court practice is but one part of the puzzle; recess appointments to the Supreme Court are the other part
and these appointments have been the subject of significant
senatorial opposition. Also, if history is to be the guide we
should focus on the key factor of ratification. Was the Senate
aware of and did it acquiescence to these judges hearing cases
prior to their confirmation? In the Senate, this lower court practice seems to have gone without remark if not entirely unnoticed.
I find no reference to the practice in recorded debate. However,
when President Eisenhower's Supreme Court appointees heard
cases prior to their confirmation that fact was noticed, debated,
and disapproved of in the Senate. That disapproval was in fact
cast in general terms that included lower court judges, as in "it is
somewhat inconsistent with the spirit of the third article ... for a
judge to make decisions when he does not occuf)' his office for
life but only until the next session of the Senate."
Turning now to the courts we ask the same question: Has
the judiciary ratified a practice of lower-court appointees hearing cases prior to their confirmation? The courts will be silent
until a case is brought. 85 After the Supreme Court ruling in 1899
in Ex Parte Ward, that the courts lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a trial by a recess appointee violated Article III,
no such cases would likely be brought. None were, until the jurisdictional objection was eliminated and the stir generated by
84. 106 CONG. REC. 18,143 (Sen. Ervin).
85. As said by Judge Norris in United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1028-29
(9th Cir. 1985), "Because the judicial branch is passive, it cannot to an assertion of power
by the political branches until third parties present the courts with a concrete case or controversy. Judicial silence simply cannot be construed as judicial acquiescence."
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the Eisenhower appointees brought the right to the fore. Therefore, those judges in Woodley who found that the courts were
part of an "unbroken acceptance" of recess appointees deciding
cases put the cart before the horse. These judges may have
started a history of judicial assent but they could not have been
relying on such a history because it did not then exist.
III. THE HISTORY RESPECTING THE POWER
The personal right to a judge free of political domination
stands to check executive power under the recess appointments
clause. Apart from this matter of right, previous to it actually,
there is the separate question of whether, und.;!r the terms of the
clause, there is such a power at all. The recess appointments
clauses gives the President the power to fill vacancies "that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate." Today, intersession recesses have shrunk from an original seven months to four or five
weeks. In these short recesses vacancies of any consequence are
less likely to occur; consequently, there are few occasions for the
power. However, the recess appointments clause has come into
another and larger use, for appointments made not during a recess but prior to the recess. Such was the case with the Clinton
and Bush recess appointments to the bench. If the power to
make appointments were made subject to, and then limited by,
the "during the recess" terms of the clause, then for all practical
purposes the power to make such appointments to the bench
disappears.
However, this particular text-based solution to the recess
appointments to the bench is thought to be unavailable, on the
grounds that history has enlarged the clause to include appointments to fill vacancies created prior to the recess in which they
are made. This history is the subject of the next section. In this
section, please keep in mind-as courts and commentators have
not-that these materials, while they do relate, are not directly
and primarily about the right to be heard by a judge free of political domination. Instead they are largely about the Senate prerogative of advice and consent and whether a recess appointment that exceeds the power invested in the President by the
recess appointments clause violates the "just rights of the Senate. "86

86.

E.g., 12 Op. Att'y Gen 32,41 (1861).
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A. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS

When Congress admitted Florida to the Union in 1845, it
provided for a federal district court judge, a United States Attorney, and a federal marshal for the new state. The Senate recessed before these offices were filled, whereupon this question
was presented to Attorney General Mason: "[h]ave you now, in
the recess of the Senate, the power to appoint the district judge,
the district attorney, and the marshal?" Mr. Mason's opinion was
that the President lacked the power. "If vacancies are known to
exist during the session of the Senate, and nominations are then
made," he said, "they cannot be filled by recess appointments in
the recess of the Senate." 87 Inasmuch as these vacancies did not
"happen during the recess of the Senate," they outran the power
provided by the clause. However, this conclusion is not that arrived at by most attorney general opinions. These opinions
commenced with that of Attorney General William Wirt in
1823.88 In this opinion Mr. Wirt changed the terms of the clause.
When the Senate adjourned without confirming his nominee to fill a vacancy at the Port of New York, President Monroe
asked Attorney General William Wirt whether the position
could be filled a recess appointment. Mr. Wirt's opinion was yes
it could. In Mr. Wirt's view, the clause's purpose was to allow the
President to fill a vacancy no matter when it was created. The
clause "does not look to the moment of the origin of the vacancy," he said, "but to the state of things at the point of time at
which the President is called on to act." 89 This true purpose,
though, could only be arrived at by modifying the terms of the
clause, which Mr. Wirt did as follows: "Now if we interpret the
word happen as being merely equivalent to 'happen to exist'," he
said, "the whole purpose of the constitution is completely accomplished. "90
The text of the clause was thus expanded to read, "vacancies that may happen {to exist} during the recess of the Senate."
If not the "literal" text of the Clause, Mr. Wirt explained, this
was its "substantial meaning." 91 Subsequent Attorneys General
87. 4 Op. Att'y Gen. 361 (1845); accord Schenck v. Peay, 21 F. Cas. 672, 674 (E.D.
Ark. 1869) (No. 12,451).
88. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 631 (1823).
89. !d. at 633. As Mr. Wirt saw it, a vacancy left unfilled, albeit outside the literal
terms of the clause, "may paralyze some essential branch of our internal police." !d. at
632.
90. !d. at 633.
91. !d.
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repeated, endorsed, and expanded this reconstruction of the
clause. 92 In 1866, the following question was put to Attorney
General Henry Stanbery: If a recess appointment is made to a
post and if there is no permanent appointment (for whatever
reason) to that post during the next session of the Senate, rna~
the President again fill the post by another recess appointment?
Answering yes, Mr. Stanbery provided an open-ended definition
of the occasions on which executive power might be exercised.
Such power, he said, "should always be capable of exercise." On
this basis, Mr. Stanbery reasoned that a President might daisy
chain recess appointments as follows:
As these appointments are to continue until the end of the
next session of the Senate, the President might omit to make
any nomination to the Senate, and then, in the ensuing recess,
reappoint the same or other officers, and thu!> throughout his
term of office defeat entirely any participation on the part of
the Senate. 94
B. CONGRESSIONAL REACTION

At about this point in time, the Congress acted. It acted
against daisy-chaining recess appointments and, more importantly, against the idea that the President might, without Senate
confirmation, fill a post not vacated during the recess in which it
was made. In 1863, the Senate directed its Judiciary Committee
to "inquire ... whether the practice ... of appointing officers to
fill vacancies which have not occurred during the recess of Congress ... is in accord with the Constitution; and if not, what remedy shall be applied. "95 The Judiciary Committee, as it said, endeavored to understand the clause according to its "true intent
and meaning." From this perspective, the recess appointment
clause was best read as limited to its "plain, popular" meaning,
which was that the President might fill only those vacancies in
fact created during the recess in which the appointment was
made.% The remedy the Committee proposed was that if a
President wished to fill a post vacated prior to the recess, he
should do so by assigning the post to an official already confirmed by the Senate.
92.

See, e.g., 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 525 (1832) (by Roger Taney as Attorney General).

93.
94.
95.
96.

12 Op. Att'y Gen. 32 (1866).
!d. at 40.
Sen. Report No. 80, Sen. Judiciary Committee, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. at 1 (1863).
!d. at 5.
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Congress, though, found a stronger remedy in its power of
the purse. In 1863 Congress provided that "No money shall be
paid from the Treasury, as salary, to any person appointed during the recess of the Senate, to fill a vacancy, in any existing office, if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in session.... "
Clearly, this act was more than a pay provision. As was then explained by Senator Fessenden, "It may not be in our power to
prevent the appointment, but it is in our power to prevent the
payment; and when payment is prevented, I think that will
probably put an end to the habit of making such appointments."§7
In 1867, the no-pay provision of the 1863 enactment was
wrapped into the Tenure of Office Act, which Act in amended
form remains in effect today. 98 This Act limited appointments to
vacancies caused by "reason of death or resignation during arecess." Because the phrase "during a recess" was so pointedly and
specifically deployed in the Act, it precluded recess appointments for vacancies created prior to the recess in which an appointment was made. Also, the Act prevented a President from
avoiding Senate confirmation by making sequential appointments running from one recess to the next. These provisions
were then enforced by providing, "no money shall be paid from
the treasury" to persons appointed contrary to the Act's provisions.99
At the start of modern times, the Senate again opposed the
recess-appointment bypass of Senate confirmation, the occasion
being President Franklin Roosevelt's previously mentioned
threat of a recess appointment to the Supreme Court. In 1937
and while the Senate was in session, Justice Van Devanter resigned from the Supreme Court. Whereupon Roosevelt ran up
this flag: He announced that his choice to fill that vacancy need
97. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 565 (1863).
98. Ch. 26, 12 Stat. 646 (1863).
99. 14 Stat. 430 (1867). The modern amendments to this Act are discussed supra at
note 77. When the Tenure of Office Act was enacted, animosity between Congress and
the President, Andrew Johnson, was in those post-Civil War days running high. The
House had sent a bill of impeachment to the Senate saying that the President had acted
unlawfully in firing the Secretary of War. The Tenure of Office Act provisions respecting
recess appointments might, therefore, be dismissed as legislation colored by the heat of
the moment. However, the recess-appointment issue had started earlier, dating from at
least the Lincoln presidency. The Judiciary Committee Report, S. Rep. 80, which was
much the basis of the congressional action in 1867, had been issued in 1863. Also, in 1863
and as stated above, Congress had acted to deny salary to recess appointees appointed to
fill vacancies that existed while the Senate when the Senate was in session Ch 26 12
Stat. 646 (1863).
.
. '
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not be submitted to the Senate. Rather, he might await the Senate's recess and then on his own motion place a new member of
the Court. With the political and constitutional waters still roiled
by Roosevelt's court-packing plan, the Senate was, shall we say,
perturbed. And it doubted the President's power. As stated by
Senator Burke, "If there is a vacancy on the Supreme Court ...
and it did not happen during a recess of the Senate, where would
the President get any authority to make an appointment to fill
the vacancy? I do not understand where the authority comes
from at all." 100
Senator Vandenberg then offered the resolution, the "sense
of the Senate" was "that an appointment to the Supreme Court
should be made only at such a time as the Senate may act upon
confirmation prior to the entry of the nominee upon his service. " 101 The ensuing debate was much the same as the debate
that in 1863-67 had preceded the Tenure in Office Act. "For 150
years," Senator Vandenberg said, "there has been an argument
as to what the word 'happen' means .... Does 'happen' mean
'occur', or does it mean 'exist'?" Once again, the Attorneys
General Opinions were offered in support of the liberal reading.
The opinion aired in the Senate, though, was that "When these
precedents are studied, however, so much politics will be found
... that one hesitates to accept the precedents in place of the
plain, simple, unmistakable language of the Constitution." 102
During this debate, a few Senators recalled the Tenure in
Office Act as it provided that "no money shall be paid from the
Treasury" to an unconfirmed appointee to a vacancy that had
existed while the Senate was in session. They dryly noted that
Roosevelt's proposed appointee should not expect to be paid. 103
In the end, FDR did not act on his threat of a recess appointment to the Supreme Court and the resolution was forgotten.
About a year after this debate in which the Tenure in Office
Act and its no-pay provision had been remembered, the Attorney General recommended that the "prohibition" of the Act be
lifted in certain situations. 104 These situations were where a vacancy arose within thirty days of the end of a session and where
100. 81 CONG. REC. 7999 (1937).
101. 81 CONG. REC. 7963 (1937).
102. 81 CONG. REC. 807 (1937).
103. 81 CoNG. REC. 8103 (1937). A small mystery: By what authority were the Eisenhower appointees paid for their services prior to confirmation?
104. Compensation for Recess Appointees in Certain Cases, S. Rep. No. 1079, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
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an office is left unfilled because of the action or inaction of the
Senate while it was in session. In 1940 amidst the start of World
War II, the Act was quietly amended to include these recommendations. As modified, though, the nucleus of the Act (today
codified under the title of "Recess Appointments") remains the
same: "Payment for services may not be made to persons appointed during a recess of the Senate to fill a vacancy in an existing office, if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in session."105
C. THE COURTS

The "celebrated" opmwn on recess appointments was
handed down in 1868, by Judge John Cadwalader in The Case of
the District Attorney of the United States. 106 Notable then but
overlooked today, this opinion nonetheless stands as the most
thoughtful examination of the scope of the recess appointment
clause. In this case, the Senate had adjourned without confirming the President's nominee as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. The President then appointed him
anyway, as a recess appointee. The question before the court was
whether that appointment was within the President's power;
Cadwalader's decision was no, because the vacancy filled had
been created prior to, and not during, the recess of the Senate.
Judge Cadwalader found that by their ordinary meaning,
the terms of the clause limited presidential appointments to
those that occurred during a recess of the Senate. But as he
noted, this plain meaning had been disputed, on the grounds that
public need would at times call for an office to be filled, regardless of when it became vacant. He further noted that the clause
had therefore been interpreted as requiring that a vacancy need
only "exist" during the recess in which an appointment was
made. Cadwalader disagreed with this interpretation. He gave
105. With the added amendments, the Act is as follows:
Payment for services may not be made from the Treasury of the United States
to an individual appointed during a recess of the Senate to fill a vacancy in an
existing office, if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in session .... This
subsection does not apply
(1) if the vacancy arose within 30 days before the end of the session of the
Senate;
(2) if, at the end of the session, a nomination for the office ... was pending
before the Senate ... , or
(3) if a nomination for the office was rejected by the Senate within 30 days
before the end of the session ....
Ch, 580,54 Stat. 751 (1940) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 5503).
106. 7 F. Cas. 731 (1868) (No. 3924).
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due regard to such "exigencies" as might attend an unfilled office but found that these "occasional evils" did not justify a departure from the plain meaning of the text. "If it had been intended to give such amplitude of power to the president,"
Cadwalader wrote, "his authority to fill vacancies in office would
not have been limited to those happening during a recess." Such
"amplitude[s] of power," he stated, "had been extensively, debated, and then rejected, at the constitutional convention. " 107
But this conclusion based on text and principle did not end
his opinion, because, as Cadwalader noted, "It is said that the
question is not open." It was said not to be open because history
had reconstructed the clause to permit appointments for vacancies created prior to a recess. Cadwalader disputed this historiography. If the construction had in fact been settled, he asked,
why had its propriety been submitted to Attorneys General, time
and again? As Cadwalader put it, "if the same question has been
repeatedly stated anew, and renewals of the former opinions of
attorney generals upon it have been obtained from their successors, this may indicate that no settled administrative usage had
been understood to be established under the former opinions." 108
Otherwise, seventy-five years ahead of Frankfurter's statement of the "gloss of history" theory of constitutional interpretation Judge Cadwalader understood what that theory had to entail. The history must include ingredients of acquiescence by
another branch of government; without which a long-standing
executive practice stands to be no more than an extended usurpation of power. As noted by Cadwalader, Congress and the
Senate, by the Tenure of Office Act and other measures, had
over the years opposed rather than ratified the executive practice.109 Nor had the courts acquiesced. Before Cadwalader applied his hand, there had been no court decisions on point. Cadwalader explained:
There has not been opportunity for judicial contestation: the
existence of the power in question has not been legislatively
recognized, has been denied by the senate, has been practically asserted by presidents only, and has not been exercised

107. /d. at 734-35.
I 08. /d.. at 736-38.
!09. Over the years, Congress had provided for recess appointments when it in a
particular session it newly created positions that it could not fill during that session. /d. at
740-44.
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without constantly recurring suggestions of them of doubts of
its existence under the constitution. 110

Judge Cadwalader's opinion was then commended as
"learned and exhaustive" and it was followedY' The one decision that did not then follow it, that of the northern district of
Georgia in In re Farrow, noted Cadwalader's "learned and able"
opinion. 112 Nonetheless, that court found that a recess appointment to a vacancy not created during a recess of the Senate was
constitutional. Its constitutionality, the court said, was owed to
"the practice of the executive department for nearly one hundred years, the acquiescence of the senate therein, and the recognition of this power by both houses of congress. " 113 But that
acquiescence, as Cadwalader had shown was not the case, so that
while the court in In re Farrow may have praised the Cadwalader opinion it surely did not study it.
Nearly a century later when a court finally revisited the issue, that court, the Second Circuit in United States v. Allocco, relied on In re Farrow and overlooked the case law to the contrary.114 The Allocco case involved an appointment to the bench
to fill a vacancy created prior to the recess in which the appointment had been made. The argument against the appointment was that "in the plain language of the Constitution [recess
appointments] may be used to only to fill vacancies, which "happen during the Recess of the Senate. " 115 The court dismissed that
argument, saying the "'the logic of words must yield to the logic
of realities."' 116 The realty the court noted was that selecting
judges entails a long process. For vacancies occurring during a
Senate session, that process cannot be "telescoped into whatever
time remains in [the] session." 117 When the process of selection

110. !d. at 744. Cadwalader also relied on scholarly commentary, that of JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,§ 1559 at 35556 (2d ed., 1851), and THOMAS SERGEANT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 373-74 (2d ed. 1830).
Both treatises supported the literal reading, that the clause gave the President the power
to make recess appointment for only those vacancies created during the recess in which
the appointment is made.
Ill. Schenck v. Peay, 21 F. Cas. 672 (1869) (No.l2,651) (relying on Story, supra note
110 at Sec. 1559, 355-56, for the proposition that the President "cannot appoint to such
offices during the Recess of the senate because the vacancy does not happen during the
recess of the senate"); In re Yancey, 28 F. 445 (W.D. Tenn. 1886).
112. 3 F. Cas. 112, 115 (N.D. Ga. 1880).
113. ld.
114. 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962).
115. ld. at 710.
116. ld.
117. ld. at 712.
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lasted into a recess, the court reasoned, the President should be
able to make the appointment at that time or else "leave the office unfilled for the months until the Senate reconvenes." The
reality the court did not consider is that recesses are no longer
for months, as the court said, but for four or five weeks and in
those few weeks intra- and intercircuit transfers can meet emergency staffing needs on the bench.
Otherwise, the court found that the "logic of words," that of
the "during the recess" terms of the clause, had been enlarged by
history. This history, as the court saw it, consisted of (a) the Attorneys General opinions liberally construing these terms and
(b) a ratification of these opinions by the courts and Congress. In
terms of ratification by the courts, the opinion in Allocco noted
that the Attorneys General opinions had been "accepted as conclusive authority ... in the single reported decision by a federal
court on the question before us." This decision, the court said,
was In re Farrow. 118 Overlooked were Judge Cadwalader's opinion and the cases that followed it. Respecting Congress, the
court felt that the opposition of that body had been softened by
the 1940 amendment to the Tenure of Office Act. That amendment showed that Congress had now determined that "The deterrent to abuse of power by Presidents conceived during the
Civil War was ... unnecessary and incongruous in an era when
the President, without the advice and consent of Congress, may
well have the power to control the destiny of mankind. " 119
The power to control the destiny of mankind is important. It
does not follow though that Congress by its 1940 amendment to
the Act altogether abandoned its opposition to recess appointments that do not conform to the terms of the clause. In that
Act, the premise that "Payment for services may not be made
from the Treasury of the United States to an individual appointed during a recess of the Senate to fill a vacancy in an existing office, if the vacancy existed while the Senate was in session"
remains in place.

*****
At the end of this long, twisting history-of attorney general
opinions and congressional reactions and court cases-we return
to the question with which we started: Have the "happen during

118.
119.

ld. at 715.
ld.

2003-04]

RECESS APPOINTMENTS

551

the Recess of the Senate" terms of the recess appointments
clause been enlarged by history? Over time, one development
has been that Senate recesses are now for a few weeks rather
than the several months the clause anticipated. Thus, the problem addressed by the clause, leaving an important office unfilled
over the months of a recess, is no longer pressing, which fact argues against enlarging the clause past its terms. Be that as it may,
the question still remains whether wisely or not, the clause has
over time been enlarged by a practice of appointments to fill vacancies that did not "happen during the Recess of the Senate."
The weight of this history is debatable, though, because it
doesn't clearly include the essential ingredient of ratification by
the other branches of government.
For 135 years Congress has stated its opposition to this practice by means of the Tenure in Office Act. Perhaps, however, the
1940 amendment of the Act may be taken as a congressional
ratification of a limited enlargement of the clause. The amendment provides that if "at the end of the session, a nomination for
the office ... was pending before the Senate" the President can
go ahead and fill that office by a recess appointment. This
enlargement, if valid, covers the recess appointments made by
Presidents Clinton and Bush, which were for appointees nominated by the President and not voted on by the Senate.
Whatever the "nomination pending before the Senate" provision may amount to otherwise, it should be noted that the
Tenure in Office Act and this exception to it pertains to all appointments. The federal courts are a special case, subject-as the
Supreme Court reminds us in Nguyen v. United States 120 -to an
overarching congressional plan of reserving seats on them to
judges holding lifetime tenure under Article III. For the federal
courts, Congress, in Title 28 of the United States Code, requires
that district court and court of appeals judges "shall hold office
during good behavior." 121 Recess appointees do not "hold office
during good behavior." This noncompliance of recess appointments to Title 28 is offered simply to show that in the total
scheme of congressional action, acquiescence by that body to
any enlargement of the recess appointments clause that would
place non-Article III judges in federal courts is a fact not easily
established.
120. 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 44(b) (2000) provides, "Circuit judges shall hold office during good
behavior." 28 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2000) provides, "The district judges shall hold office dur·
ing good behavior."
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Moreover, congressional concessions, or claims of such concession, respecting the appointments power should not in any
event be lightly accepted. As explained by the Supreme Court:
The Appointments Clause ... preserves ... the Constitution's structural integrity by preventing the diffusion
of the appointment power. ... Neither Congress nor the
Executive can agree to waive this structural protection .... The structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of aniz one branch of
Government but of the entire Republic. 22
"Non-waiver" being the case, the courts should independently
review any claim of congressional concession to see if fits the
terms and purposes of the recess appointments clause.
Also, more is at stake here than waiver of senatorial prerogative. For recess appointments to the bench, enlargements of
the appointments power operate in the face of individual right,
that of a litigant to be heard by a judge free of political domination. In this personal rights context, Congress may be conceding
that which does not belong to it. Not precisely on this point but
nonetheless persuasive, Judge Norris in the Woodley case noted,
"Our system affords each individual litigant the opportunity to
vindicate his or her personal rights through the judicial process.
The political branches cannot extinguish such rights by establishing 'adverse possession' through longstanding historical practice."123 Finally, and no doubt this goes without saying, even if
Presidents Clinton and Bush had the power the make appointments to vacancies created prior to the recess of the Senate,
there remains the primary issue, whether that power is checked
by the right to a judge free of political domination.
CONCLUSION
If the power to make recess appointments is defined according to the terms of the clause, which provide for appointments to
fill only those vacancies that "happen during a recess of the Senate," then the modern practice of recess appointments to the
bench will be ended. Today, these appointments are for vacancies created not during but prior to the recess in which they are
122. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878·80 (1991).
!23. United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1030-31 (9th Cir. 1985); cf Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) ("By increasi~g the pow~r. of t~e President
beyond what the Framers envisioned, the statute compromises the pohtical liberty of our
citizens, liberty which the separation of powers seeks to secure.").
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made. If the power is not so limited, then for recess appointments to the bench a conflict between power and right, arises,
the right being that of a litigant to be heard by a judge freed of
political domination. Where an appointment to the bench is not
justified in terms of the urgent public purpose upon which the
recess appointment clause rests (and today, for appointments to
the bench, no such urgency will likely exist), then in the conflict
of power and right the right should prevail.
POSTSCRIPT
By letter of March 5, 2004, to the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, Senator Edward Kennedy has particularly objected to
the recess appointment of William Pryor to that court. The objection is that the appointment was not made during the recess
between the sessions of the Senate but was instead made during
an intrasession recess over the Presidents' Day holiday. In terms
of the substantial principles at play in these appointments, this
intrasession as opposed to an intersession objection seems a
small point. Intersession and intrasession appointments alike
breach a litigant's right to be heard be a judge free of political
domination. Likewise, any one of the Clinton/Bush appointments are outside the ordinary sense and terms of the clause in
that they were for vacancies that did not "happen during the Recess of the Senate."
But while it may be a relatively small point, the Kennedy
letter does have a point. The recess appointments clause identifies the recess between two full sessions of the Senate, not a recess within a session. The manifest purpose for the clause is to
allow for appointments during the predictably long recess between full sessions, when Senators would have dispersed out of
the capital for months or so, beyond the reach of quick recall.
This purpose is carried out by the terms of the clause. The clause
refers to the singular, to "the Recess" and not to "recesses."
Also, inasmuch as the clause refers to "all vacancies" that "happen during the Recess," surely the clause would similarly say "all
recesses" if it included the indefinite number of breaks that may
occur during a session. Finally, the clause provides that recess
appointments "shall expire at the end of their next session."
"Their next session" clearly refers to the next full session of the
Senate; it would make no sense for an appointee's term to end
within weeks at the Senate's first intrasession recess. By parallel
construction, the "the Recess of the Senate" must also refer to a

554

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 20:515

full session of the Senate and mean a recess between two full
sessions as opposed to an intrasession recess. 124
This reading of the clause is, I know, inconsistent with various Attorneys General opinions. 125 But then these opinions are
inconsistent with the terms of the clause, which fact was recognized in the first Attorney General Opinion on point, that of
Philander Chase Knox in 1901. President Theodore Roosevelt
had asked Knox whether he might properly make an appointment during a seventeen-day recess for Christmas. The opinion
given was that this was not a "recess" within the meaning of the
recess appointments clause, inasmuch as that clause provided
only for "the period after the final adjournment of Congress for
the session, and before the next session begins. " 126 The subsequent opinions that approved intra-session appointments relied
not on the ordinary meaning of the clause but rather versions of
"the practical sense" of it. Attorney General Harry Daugherty in
the first of these opinions stated, "the real question, as I view it,
is whether in a practical sense the Senate is in session so that its
advice and consent can be obtained. " 127 In his opinion to the contrary, Attorney General Knox had not been blind to this "practical sense." However, an "argument from inconvenience," he
said, "like the argument against a power because of its possible
abuse, can not be admitted to obscure the true principles and
distinctions ruling the point. " 128

124. See Memorandum from the Senate (July 1, 1993) (at S8545 & S8546) (on intrasession appointments).
125. 33 Op. Att'y Gen. 20 (1921) (Attorney General Daug~erty). A more recent
opinion to the same effect is that of the Office of Legal Counsel m 16 U.S. Op. OLC 15
(1993).
.
.
.
.
126. 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 599, 601 (1901). The question of mtrasesswn appomtments
did not arise until the twentieth century and this opinion was the first to address the
question.
127. 33 Op. Att'y Gen. at 21-22 (emphasis in the original).
128. 23 Op. Att'y Gen. at 603.
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APPENDIX
SUPREME COURT RECESS APPOINTMENTS
Actions
Heard
Prior to
Confirm ation

Recess
App't

Confirmation

Thomas Johnson

08/0511791

11/07/1791

none

John Rutledge

07/01/1795

Nom. rejected,

2

Bushrod Washington

09/29/1798

12/20/1798

none

Alfred Moore

10/2011799

12/10/1799

none

Henry Livingston

11/10/1806

12/17/1806

none

Smith Thompson

09/0111823

12/09/1823

none

John McKinlc::y_

11108/1837

09/2511837

none

Levi Woodbury

09/20/1845

01103/1846

none

Benjamin Curtis

09/22/1851

12/20/1851

2

David Davis

10/17/1862

12/08/1862

none

John Marshall Harlan

03/29/1877

11/29/1877

none

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

08/11/1902

12/02/1902

none

Earl Warren

10/02/1953

03/01/1954

several

William Brennan

10/15/1956

03/19/1957

several

Potter Stewart

10/14/1958

05/05/1959

several

Justice

12/15/1795

